Apr 182013
 

In my previous post, I noted the low median income in the census tract surrounding the Sedgwick stop on the Brown and Purple Lines. That the median income in that part of the city would be less than $20k went against my own experience of Chicago—as well as my prejudices about the North Side. How could a census tract a (light) stone’s throw (by a strong arm) from Lincoln Park, a few blocks away from the Container Store(s) and sundry other gateways to yuppie distinction in Wicker Park and Bucktown have such a low median income? Was there a mistake?

In the post, I suggested that the culprit was the ghost of Cabrini-Green. After all, as Whet reminds us, the ACS is a rolling survey, meaning that the 2011 version still has data from 2007, when Cabrini-Green still existed. But I bristled a bit at that explanation: Cabrini-Green, at least the Green high-rises, weren’t in that tract. Nor are the original Frances Cabrini Homes. The high-rises are in the tract just to the west, and the row houses are a bit to the south.Cabrini-Green-2And even so, look at the coloring in the tracts: where the high rises once were is relatively better off than the Sedgwick tract, and the Cabrini Homes are even better off, in terms of median income, being in the same discussion as the handsome tract just east of Sedgwick, where I’ve had a devil of a time finding parking on the way to Oak St. Beach because of all the fancy cars already gobbling up all the street parking.

So unless I’m making some kind of mistake, this answer is insufficient. Another idea is that the massive depopulation of the Green high-rises has spilled into the Sedgwick tract. There might be something to this. After all, in 2000, what is now the tract that includes the high-rises was three separate tracts, suggesting serious depopulation (NB: the blues are still for the 2010 tracts):

Screen Shot 2013-04-17 at 19.28.13

2000 census tracts in pink on background of 2010 tracts.

But that only provides some of the answer: the high-rises area is economically well off now since there are no longer 10,000 people involved in the CHA living there. It still tells us nothing about the Sedgwick tract.

Yet maybe there’s an answer in what I’ve already mentioned above: Oak St. beach, parking, Container Store, Lincoln Park… that is, a certain amount of upper middle-class white privilege. Let’s break down these tracts by median income (with margins of error) and then by estimated median incomes of white and African-American households:

Median income w/ MoE (top), white median income (center), African-American median income (bottom)

Median income w/ MoE (top), white median income (center), African-American median income (bottom)

Keeping in mind the sometimes outlandish margins of error, this area begins to tell a rather different story depending on who’s telling it. These tracts are all comfortably upper middle-class for their white inhabitants, while the story for the African-American inhabitants is rather more all over the map (further indicated by the margins of error), but decidedly distant from the lofty heights of six-digit annual incomes. So as a non-expert on this neighborhood like me, it’s the white income that tells the story I expect given the retail, entertainment, and housing options nearby.

Is the white story the majority story here, though? Here’s the last picture of the area that puts my assumptions into check:

Screen Shot 2013-04-17 at 18.59.57-2It’s tempting to say that these numbers speak for themselves and leave it at that, but two quick caveats: the margins of error tip past ±10% for the two tracts just south of the Sedgwick tract. Elsewhere they’re all within 10%.

In geography school, we quickly learn Tobler’s First Law of Geography, where everything influences everything, but near things influence things more than far things. And in that case, we do see the effect of the Cabrini-Green public housing efforts on the racial and income makeup of the tracts surrounding it. So the answer to “what’s the matter with Sedgwick?” is simply “nothing at all.” It’s not an aberration. It and its nearby tracts reflect the brutal racial and economic segregation of Chicago that continues to this day. And my surprise at that is just a function of my own time spent living within that segregation.

 Posted by on April 18, 2013
Apr 172013
 

Pete sent out this New Yorker interactive web thingy that handsomely redraws each MTA line as, instead, a graph of median income rising and falling as the trains move between poorer and richer neighborhoods. I figured it would take only a few hours to throw something similar for Chicago, and I was right.

Below are each CTA line’s stations plotted against the median income of the census tract that contains the station.1

So we can see that there are similarities with the MTA. As trains move into the Loop (Manhattan), the median income rises, and then it falls as trains move back out of the Loop (Manhattan). As with the New York data, we can see some pretty distinct variance in median incomes. The Green Line moves from nice (but not as nice as nearby) Oak Park to some of the poorest parts of Chicago before emerging in the Loop, only to bend south through some more of the poorest parts of Chicago. The Purple Line starts at the super tony Linden stop in Wilmette before moving through less fancy Evanston on its way to the Loop.

What’s going on at Sedgwick? Census tracts are marked in purple. (click to enlarge)

In short, the graphs affirm most of what we already knew. Though I also was not expecting the Blue Line to be so much nicer between Western and Grand than it is in the Loop.

There’s also at least one startling hiccup: the huge dive in median income at the Sedgwick stop on the Brown and Purple Lines. I double checked everything, and that’s the correct tract number. I can only guess that there’s a residual effect of Cabrini-Green’s ghost that’s pulling that number down. Even so, however, the Sedgwick census tract is bordered by North, Sedgwick, Division, and Larrabee, meaning that it’s one tract to the east of Cabrini-Green (which was west of Larrabee) and one tract to the north of the Frances Cabrini Homes, which are south of Division.

But part of putting this data together was to test another, unrelated hypothesis. I’ve long suspected that the CTA ignores poorer neighborhoods of Chicago, considering how the lines don’t even make it out to the southwest side, and it feels like it’s merely the lowly Green Line fighting its way valiantly to serve the mass of lower-income areas of the West Side. These graphs speak to neither. Also, they don’t tell us whether truly rich areas are served by the CTA, since we have no idea how high that median income number can go. As a result, as is often the case, it’s now more useful to make a map (almost functioning interactive version available on GeoCommons):

Screen Shot 2013-04-17 at 13.29.50

What I was not expecting to see was that the primary poorer part of the city abandoned by the CTA isn’t the area around Marquette Park on the southwest side (which uniformly sits comfortably in the second of seven bins), but, rather, the southeast side, made up of the South Shore, East Side, and South Chicago community areas. I always assumed this area to be more prosperous, but the median income tale suggests otherwise. The wealth of the southeast side is still along Stony Island and Jeffrey, in from the lake.

Furthermore, it’s not the Green Line coursing through the lower-income West Side by itself; it’s joined by both Blue and Pink Lines.

But this then prompts yet another question. Does money follow the CTA or is it the other way around?2 The median income is higher in tracts near the Red and Brown Lines on the North Side than it is for latitudinally parallel patches of land closer to the lake, where one might expect to find more money. I also doubt anyone would be surprised if it turned out that a large part of Bucktown, Wicker Park, and Ukrainian Village’s appeal to higher-income types are their sitting right on the Blue Line, making travel into the Loop for work trivial.

But the CTA doesn’t guarantee a (relative) level of prosperity. The two final stops on the Ashland side of the Green Line look like they’re doing the opposite, as they’re surrounded by low-income neighborhoods, with the better off tracts farther, rather than closer to the El. Englewood has a low median income but sits right on the Green Line. Beverly and Ashburn, on the other hand, are better off but serviced only by Metra. I recall back in the mid-90s, when the Green Line was being renovated, that people wanted it torn down along 63rd St. precisely because it was a blight. No one wanted to live by the El, and no one wanted to have shops underneath it. I strongly doubt that opinion is uniform throughout the city.

Anyway, in closing, one truly sad thing about living in Vilnius is that I couldn’t toss together this kind of a bit of data visualization about it without leaving my chair and in only a few hours.

  1. In greater detail: I used the 2011 5-yr ACS data on Cook County as provided by FactFinder and joined that with a shapefile of all of the census tracts in Cook County provided by TIGER. Then I pulled in the CTA shapefiles from the City of Chicago (I had actually already done this, but whatever). There were a couple spatial joins and blah blah, and I ended up with a census tract for each station. Many stations straddle census tracts, but I let the spatial join be the arbiter. Then I filtered down the median income dataset to include just the tracts with stations, exercised some patience while dealing with Tableau, and there you go.
  2. Obviously I could piece together some sort of answer using historical data, but for now I’ll leave it to speculation.
 Posted by on April 17, 2013
Apr 172013
 

Pete sent out this New Yorker interactive web thingy that handsomely redraws each MTA line as, instead, a graph of median income rising and falling as the trains move between poorer and richer neighborhoods. I figured it would take only a few hours to throw something similar for Chicago, and I was right.

Below are each CTA line’s stations plotted against the median income of the census tract that contains the station.1

So we can see that there are similarities with the MTA. As trains move into the Loop (Manhattan), the median income rises, and then it falls as trains move back out of the Loop (Manhattan). As with the New York data, we can see some pretty distinct variance in median incomes. The Green Line moves from nice (but not as nice as nearby) Oak Park to some of the poorest parts of Chicago before emerging in the Loop, only to bend south through some more of the poorest parts of Chicago. The Purple Line starts at the super tony Linden stop in Wilmette before moving through less fancy Evanston on its way to the Loop.

What’s going on at Sedgwick? Census tracts are marked in purple. (click to enlarge)

In short, the graphs affirm most of what we already knew. Though I also was not expecting the Blue Line to be so much nicer between Western and Grand than it is in the Loop.

There’s also at least one startling hiccup: the huge dive in median income at the Sedgwick stop on the Brown and Purple Lines. I double checked everything, and that’s the correct tract number. I can only guess that there’s a residual effect of Cabrini-Green’s ghost that’s pulling that number down. Even so, however, the Sedgwick census tract is bordered by North, Sedgwick, Division, and Larrabee, meaning that it’s one tract to the east of Cabrini-Green (which was west of Larrabee) and one tract to the north of the Frances Cabrini Homes, which are south of Division.

But part of putting this data together was to test another, unrelated hypothesis. I’ve long suspected that the CTA ignores poorer neighborhoods of Chicago, considering how the lines don’t even make it out to the southwest side, and it feels like it’s merely the lowly Green Line fighting its way valiantly to serve the mass of lower-income areas of the West Side. These graphs speak to neither. Also, they don’t tell us whether truly rich areas are served by the CTA, since we have no idea how high that median income number can go. As a result, as is often the case, it’s now more useful to make a map (almost functioning interactive version available on GeoCommons):

Screen Shot 2013-04-17 at 13.29.50

What I was not expecting to see was that the primary poorer part of the city abandoned by the CTA isn’t the area around Marquette Park on the southwest side (which uniformly sits comfortably in the second of seven bins), but, rather, the southeast side, made up of the South Shore, East Side, and South Chicago community areas. I always assumed this area to be more prosperous, but the median income tale suggests otherwise. The wealth of the southeast side is still along Stony Island and Jeffrey, in from the lake.

Furthermore, it’s not the Green Line coursing through the lower-income West Side by itself; it’s joined by both Blue and Pink Lines.

But this then prompts yet another question. Does money follow the CTA or is it the other way around?2 The median income is higher in tracts near the Red and Brown Lines on the North Side than it is for latitudinally parallel patches of land closer to the lake, where one might expect to find more money. I also doubt anyone would be surprised if it turned out that a large part of Bucktown, Wicker Park, and Ukrainian Village’s appeal to higher-income types are their sitting right on the Blue Line, making travel into the Loop for work trivial.

But the CTA doesn’t guarantee a (relative) level of prosperity. The two final stops on the Ashland side of the Green Line look like they’re doing the opposite, as they’re surrounded by low-income neighborhoods, with the better off tracts farther, rather than closer to the El. Englewood has a low median income but sits right on the Green Line. Beverly and Ashburn, on the other hand, are better off but serviced only by Metra. I recall back in the mid-90s, when the Green Line was being renovated, that people wanted it torn down along 63rd St. precisely because it was a blight. No one wanted to live by the El, and no one wanted to have shops underneath it. I strongly doubt that opinion is uniform throughout the city.

Anyway, in closing, one truly sad thing about living in Vilnius is that I couldn’t toss together this kind of a bit of data visualization about it without leaving my chair and in only a few hours.

  1. In greater detail: I used the 2011 5-yr ACS data on Cook County as provided by FactFinder and joined that with a shapefile of all of the census tracts in Cook County provided by TIGER. Then I pulled in the CTA shapefiles from the City of Chicago (I had actually already done this, but whatever). There were a couple spatial joins and blah blah, and I ended up with a census tract for each station. Many stations straddle census tracts, but I let the spatial join be the arbiter. Then I filtered down the median income dataset to include just the tracts with stations, exercised some patience while dealing with Tableau, and there you go.
  2. Obviously I could piece together some sort of answer using historical data, but for now I’ll leave it to speculation.
 Posted by on April 17, 2013
Mar 232013
 

 

In general, the database behind hastac.org includes little information about the physical geography of HASTAC members. There is an optional profile field in which members can enter their location information, but only a scarce few of you have done so.*

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 Posted by on March 23, 2013
Mar 222013
 
Pagiriai exclave

Pagiriai exclave in shapefile and in satellite photo. (click to enlarge)

Every map nerd in the world is probably fascinated by exclaves, and, as a map nerd, I count myself in that number.

So today I found out this morning that there’s a new set of shapefiles of country boundaries provided by the Humanitarian Information Unit, purported to be the most high-resolution available. As a result, I had to download them and check them out. I immediately tossed them into qGIS and started looking at how high-res these things actually are. And they are. While scrolling around the Lithuania-Belarus border, however, I found a Lithuanian exclave near the peculiar “Dieveniškes appendix,” a small chunk of Lithuania thrust into Belarus that’s about 3km wide at its narrowest point, nearest the “rest” of Lithuania. Of course, this area is a strong mix of ethnic Polish, Lithuanians, as well as Belarusians, so the borders here are naturally very murky. In fact, in Lithuanian school, I was taught that “Lithuania’s” border in this area was the Nemunas (Неман) river, a good 30km to the south.


View Larger Map

But wait, Lithuania has an exclave? How come it’s not on OpenStreetMap (above)? Or Google Maps? Or Maps.lt? And why is it so hilariously tiny? Looking at the satellite imagery, it looks like a single farm!

The reason it’s not on any contemporary maps is pretty straightforward. The exclave in the shapefile is the Pagiriai exclave, one of the shortest-lived exclaves in history, lasting only since Lithuanian independence until a treaty in 1996, which gave the land to Belarus in exchange for an equivalent amount of land contiguous with the Lithuanian border. Luckily, an even bigger map nerd than I, Jan S. Krogh, did the research for me:

Mr Josif Rybak, a former mayor of Salcininkai municipality told methat Pagiriai before 1990 belonged to a collective farm under various organisations (kolukiai, tarybinis ukis, valstybes zemes ukio imone Salcininkai) before it in 1994 became a private company (bendrove). During the Soviet period republic borders had no real significance and it happened that regional exclaves appeared. The actual name of this company is not known, but it certainly does not exist anymore. According to the information it was only one house there in a rather bad shape about 1995. One family lived there, the Zanegina family living there which consisted from the mother (about 75 years) and at least two sons (about 50 years of age) thereof one was officially registered at the house. The son not registered had been imprisoned. The family was not of Lithuanian or Polish origin, but most likely Russian. They accepted that their farm, where the house was not their own property, could be Byelorussian territory on condition they would be granted Lithuanian citizenships and pensions. After 1995 the brothers moved to Zavisonys village north of Salcininkai town. According to what is known the sons who both are said to be social cases are now both living from odd jobs they are getting in Salcininkai area. The mother is not alive anymore.

So there you have it. Krogh even visited the exclave with two Lithuanians and provides photos of the ruins of the farmhouse and surrounding land.

Of course, Lithuania still has one fun geographic curiosity. While not an exclave, the town of Neringa shares a land border with Russia but a water border with the rest of Lithuania, making it much like the Eastern Shore of Virginia.

 Posted by on March 22, 2013
Mar 122013
 

Mapping technology has recently been the focus of much critical attention as evidenced by numerous efforts to develop new ways of visualizing physical and textual spaces. The proliferation of tools such as Neatline, The DM Project, Google Earth, and Walking Through Time has made mapping the stuff of both academic endeavours and everyday life.

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Oct 202012
 

A friend looked over my recent posts and said, basically, that this analysis of things that had already happened was all find and dandy, but might it be possible to predict the results of the second round? On Tuesday, I speculated that a coalition of the Labor Party (Darbo partija), Social Democrats, and Order and Justice (Tvarka ir teisingumas) would be at most 11 seats away from a majority, meaning that the three parties have 11 second round elections against other parties that they have to win. But what are the chances of getting those 11 seats? Similarly, considering that the conservatives (TS-LKD) are the most represented party in the second round, how likely is it that the Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius’s words—that his party will be the largest faction in the new Seimas—will come true?

I’m not an elections prognosticator—there’s already one alum of my university who does that rather well—but, I am a bit of a hobbyist. So I decided to take the results of the first round and develop a predicting methodology for the second round. For the TL;DR crowd, here are the results:

  • The conservatives will pick up 11 seats.
  • The Social Democrats will pick up 11 seats.
  • The Labor Party will pick up nine seats.
  • Order and Justice will pick up four seats.
  • The Polish Action (Lenkų akcija) will pick up two seats.
  • The liberals (LRLS) will pick up one seat.
  • The Path of Courage (Drąsos kelias) will pick up one seat.

That’s 37 of 68 seats. The rest my methodology considers too close to call. But it does indicate that the Social Democrats, Labor, and Order and Justice still have some work to do to get to a majority. What was the methodology? Both of the parties in each run-off were awarded bonus points based on certain criteria. If a party scored more than three bonus points, it was solid for that party. If a party scored more than one point, it was a slight favorite. If both parties picked up less than one point, it was considered a toss-up.

Here’s the rather arbitrary way the points were distributed:

  • +1 for an incumbent (or if the candidate is a member of the incumbent party). +.5 if the incumbent party is not represented at all. (This second part was a bit tricky, since parties are so volatile in Lithuania)
  • +1 if the candidate won the first round by more than 20 points. +.5 for a win of more than ten points. +.25 for a win of more than five points. The inverse was true for the first round runner-up.
  • +1 if the candidate’s party also was the party that received the most votes in the constituency in proportional voting.
  • +1 if the candidate’s party received votes at a percentage two standard deviations (or more) above the party’s national mean in the constituency. +.25 if it was more than one standard deviation above the mean. The inverse was applied if the party underperformed its national average within the constituency.
  • +1 if the candidate’s party was the leading proportional party and received 28% or more of the vote in proportional voting (one standard deviation above the mean of all top parties in all constituencies of ~24%).

The rationale was:

  • Incumbency would be rewarded, even in an election about change. There would even be a trace effect if a new candidate represented the incumbent party. But both sides benefited a bit if it was a clean slate.
  • Beating up on the second place candidate in the first round bodes well for the second round.
  • Representing a popular party in the constituency helps.
  • If your party is especially locally popular, it helps.
  • If your party demolished the others in proportional voting, it helps.

Interestingly, only two candidates received 4.5 bonus points (against .25 for their opponents), and both represent the Polish Action. Somehow I’m a little skeptical that these are locks, since I suspect the non-Polish population in both constituencies will rally and vote for the Lithuanian candidate. The question is if there will be enough Lithuanians voting to offset the Polish vote. In the other constituencies, the matrices get too complicated for me to consider.

So how does it play out spatially? Glad you asked (as always, click to enlarge):

It’s no surprise that there’s some correlation with the maps from the previous post; that correlation is built into the means by which I hand out bonus points. The toss-ups (mostly) have the showdown indicated on the map. The party that got more votes in the first round is the first mentioned. I’ll also include a few explanations of abbreviations: TT = Order and Justice. LCS = other liberals. Indep = Independent candidate. VZ = Peasants & Greens. Also, the three “decided” constituencies feature candidates who broke the 50% threshold in the first round and face no run-off.

In the Vilnius inset, the northwestern toss-up is Fabijoniškių constituency. It’s TS-LKD vs. Darbo p. The eastern constituency, Naujosios Vilnios, is Lenkų a. vs. Darbo p. The large one in the southwest, Lazdynų constituency, is TS-LKD vs. LRLS.

All three Kaunas toss-ups are TS-LKD vs. Drąsos k. In Klaipėda, the northern toss-up, Danės constituency, is TS-LKD vs. LCS. The southern constituency is actually Pajūrio constituency, which makes up much of the coast. It’s TS-LKD vs. Darbo p.

A few small consituencies are obscured in the main map. Alytaus constituency is a Darbo p. vs. SocDemai toss-up. The northern constituency of Panevėžys, Nevėžio, is TS-LKD vs. Darbo p., and the southern constituency, Vakarinės, is Indep. vs. Darbo p. Marijampolės tiny constituency is mostly blocked by the label for the surrounding Suvalkijos constituency. It’s a slight SocDemai favorite.

So there are some predictions. We’ll see in just over a week how ridiculous they were.

 Posted by on October 20, 2012
Oct 192012
 

In my previous post, I provided links to fancy interactive maps from the Lithuanian Election Commission. They map turnout, how people voted on the referendum, and other fun things.

But they also map something completely useless, namely the party that “won” each constituency in the vote to decide how many proportional seats the party will get in Seimas. This is a completely stupid way to represent a map, since the point of the proportional seats is that they are distributed based on the percentage of the national vote a party gets. The Labor Party (Darbo partija) did not get 17 proportional seats in Seimas since they “won” 17 constituencies—that part still has to be determined. Rather, across the nation, they received enough votes to earn 17 of the 70 proportional seats. After all, according to the interactive map, Labor “won” 26 of the constituencies (if I count correctly). As such, their performance is hard to interpret across the nation as a whole, because we have no idea what the actual percentages were in each constituency. All we know is that they did well.

Consider this situation: in constituency A, Labor gets 15%, the conservatives (TS-LKD) 14%, and the rest of the parties split the rest of the vote among themselves. In the map, it’s colored for Labor. Now, in constituency B, Labor got 30% of the vote, the conservatives got 35%, and the rest of the parties split the remaining votes. B is colored for the conservatives (green in the interactive map), but I think it would be rather interesting to know that Labor performed so strongly in that constituency.

I’d like to know how each party did independently among all the constituencies. That way we can see where their strongholds might be. To do this, I collected all the vote results and then compared each constituency’s performance against the national total for each party.

For example, the Labor Party received 19.84% of the vote of Lithuania as a whole. In the Pajūrio constituency along the coast, however, Labor received 16.61%. In the interactive map, the constituency is colored blue, despite the fact that the party received a smaller proportion of votes of the national result! Labor didn’t “win” anything here! They underperformed. They are colored blue only since the vote was generally extremely fractured, and 16.61% was the most a party could collect (the liberals were a percentage point behind them).

So I decided to create a map for each party that managed the 5% threshold. Each map shows how that party performed in every constituency against the national total. In my map, the Pajūrio constituency is colored light red, because Labor performed between -2.5% and -.5% worse than the national result. The darker red, the more a party underperformed. The darker blue, the more a party overperformed. White means they performed more or less in line with the national result. Click on each map to see the larger version of it.

As one can see, while there aren’t outrageously new developments indicated in these maps, they certainly tell a lot more than the interactive map provided by the government and their GIS consultants.

As in that map, we see that Labor did very well throughout Aukštaitija. But we also see that they did reasonably well throughout the entire nation. They got killed in the three largest cities (Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipėda, as noted in the insets), and their support faded as they went toward the coast. As we’ll see, that’s the stronghold of the other main populist party, Order and Justice (Tvarka ir teisingumas).

Labor might likely enter into a coalition with the Social Democrats. Again, in the interactive map, it looks like they have strong support in Suvalkija, in the southwest. My map shows the same, but it also shows strong support nationwide, which explains why both they and Labor are atop the seat count, with 15 and 17 respectively. They also got killed in the major cities, but they dominated Šiauliai and did reasonably in Panevėžys. Most notably, they also got killed in Polish Lithuania (see below).

The third party in terms of seats were the conservatives, who collected 13 seats. In an election about change featuring the historically/hysterically unpopular Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius, it would make sense that his party gets slammed. And that’s what we see on the national scale. But where the countryside went for Labor and the Social Democrats, now we see that the two largest cities went hard for the conservatives. The city of Vilnius is a blue marble in a sea of resentful red.

Next up are the liberals (there are many liberals, but only the Liberal Movement received seats), who picked up seven seats. In the interactive map, the only hint we get that the liberals showed up was in Klaipėda. In my map, we see the truth of my comment in my previous post: everyone I know (and I only know city-dwellers) voted conservative or liberal. Just as with the conservatives, Vilnius and Kaunas are blue marbles surrounded by opposition. But now we also see how much support the Liberals have on the seaside, as well. Klaipėda is entirely dark blue, and the surrounding Gargždų constituency is also for the liberals.

Here I’ll pause for a moment for my American readers to wrap their heads around the idea that, in Lithuania, center-right parties do well in cities, while center-left parties do well in the countryside.

Well, that’s not entirely true, since the anti-government Drąsos kelias (Path of Courage), which emerged out of outrage at the government for not weeding out the pedophiles in their midst (I’m not kidding) received its strongest support in the outskirts of Kaunas. Of course, those very outskirts include the suburb of Garliava, which is where the incidents that led to the forming of the party occurred. They’re riding their outrage to seven seats as well.

Further complicating the idea of the center-left countryside, we see that the right-wing populist Order and Justice party, led by impeached president Rolandas Paksas, have their stronghold in Žemaitija, the area around Klaipėda. In the interactive map, they seem to only hold sway in the southern part of the region, but in this map, we see that their support is more widespread, which is why they managed six seats. Though they don’t have much support nationwide, we see the beginnings of a problem with this means of analysis: the party only received 7,31% of the national vote. As such, one might think it nearly impossible for a party getting only slightly more than 5% of the national vote to have sections that get colored dark red.

Well, one would think that as long as they don’t know about the one inviolate radical schism in Lithuanian politics: between Lithuanians and Poles. If one doesn’t know the history of the Vilnius region, especially during the interwar period, the map of the performance of the Polish Action should explain all. With 5.83% of the vote (good for five seats), the Polish Action is absolutely a non-entity in nearly the entire country. Yet they’re so strong in the Vilnius area that, despite receiving effectively no votes in the rest of the country, they still manage to do what 11 parties could not: seat members in Seimas based on proportional voting.

There remain problems with my analysis here: I rather arbitrarily chose the break points of -5%, -2.5%, -.5%, .5%, 2.5%, and 5% knowing ahead of time what the data would more or less look like. But it leads to less useful results especially in extreme cases, like the Polish Action. Using Jenks natural breaks, we get a better  sense of how the Polish Action support is distributed around the area in Vilnius, for example. Furthermore, if a party gets, say, 50% of the vote, what does it matter if one constituency got them 56%? That difference is not as great as a party that got 2% of the vote nationwide but got 4% in one constituency. Though the total number of percentage points is smaller, it represents a doubling of the vote in comparison to the national total.

I figured it would be interesting to see, then, which parties over- and underperformed the national results. And might there be some parties whose fervid support is masked by the consensus seen in the maps above?

To answer this, I took each party’s percentage result in each constituency and averaged them for each party. This number is a bit different than the national result, but only by about a half a percentage point (and the difference decreases as the average approaches zero). I then compared each constituency’s performance as a factor of standard deviations above (or below) the mean. Two more maps were the result (and one really must click on these maps to see the large versions).

In the first map like this, which shows radical overperformers, we see that Labor’s stronghold is truly in the area just north of Kaunas. The Social Democrats are strong in Suvalkija, which makes sense, as their party leader, Algirdas Butkevičius, is from there. We see, furthermore, that the conservatives aren’t fervently supported anywhere in the country, outside of a region in Kaunas. Though they performed well in the national result, they never had the most excited support base. The lesser parties that received seats match more or less the results above: Order and Justice around Klaipėda, while the liberals are strongest on the coast, the Path of Courage as a strictly Kaunas affair, and the Polish Action surrounding Vilnius.

The results in Vilnius, though, deserve a bit of explication. First, we see the bright turquoise sliver in the middle. That’s the first constituency, Naujamiesčio. All voters registered abroad are bunched into that constituency, and that color corresponds to the Emigrant’s Party. We can see their support in other cities, as well: they are the most fervently supported party in both constituencies in Panevėžys and Alytus. Surrounding Naujamiesčio constituency are the desaturated greens of the Yes Association (Sąjunga Taip),  the liberal breakaway party founded by Artūras Zuokas, the mayor of Vilnius. Abutting Vilnius to the east is the Naujosios Vilnios constituency, the home constituency of Algirdas Paleckis and, hence, a logical stronghold of his far-left Socialist People’s Front (Socialistinis liaudės Frontas). The rest of the map is interesting mostly if one can keep track of all the smaller parties in Lithuania, and I certainly can’t. As a final note, though, I’ll indicate the support the Peasants and Greens received around Šiauliai.

The second map, as the title suggests, shows where parties performed astonishingly weakly. Mostly, it shows two things we already knew: conservative and liberal support is exceptionally urban (noted by how frequently we see their colors in the countryside), and that Labor and the Social Democrats were wildly unpopular in the largest cities.

In closing, I have to add something about the efforts to make these maps. Unlike in the US, whose government hands out GIS datasets left and right, as far as I can tell, in Lithuania, the shapefile used in the interactive map is proprietary and belongs to the consultancy firm that makes the government’s maps for it. This is, in my opinion, profoundly fucked up. Not only did it delay the production of this post (as I spent all of yesterday hand-digitizing the inexact shapefile I used to make these maps—the inexactness of the shapes is why I’ve not made them interactive), but it’s just bad policy. Among the biggest problems I see in Lithuania is its knee-jerk pro-privatization (a relic of anti-communism, I’m certain), and the fact that I need to talk to a business in order to get data that the government should be collecting/providing (for free, even) is a catastrophe.

 Posted by on October 19, 2012
Oct 172012
 

Proportional party list results. Click to interact.

About five percent of Lithuanians voted early with me during the course of the week. The bulk of the electorate, at over 50% turnout, voted on Sunday to promote a different direction in the Lithuanian Parliament. Out are the conservatives and liberals. In are the populist/centrist Labor Party and Social Democrats, who will likely form a coalition along with the Euro-skeptic, populist, conservative (and appropriately menacingly named) Order and Justice Party.

In the map on the side, which is provided via Esri’s online mapping service, it’s possible to see where parties had their strongest support.1 Though the 70 proportional seats are blind to first-past-the-post on a constituency basis (which is what the colors here indicate), we can see that the Order and Justice Party did best around Klaipėda (yellow), Labor did well in Aukštaitija (blue), the Social Democrats did well in Suvalkija (red), the conservatives did well in the major cities (green), the Polish Action did well in the area around Vilnius (grey), and the fringe party Drąsios Kelias (“Path of Courage,” which emerged out of the Garliava affair) did well in the area around Kaunas, which includes Garliava (pink).

In the specific parliamentary constituencies, things are a bit less clear, since a candidate has to earn 50% of the constituency’s support in the first round in order to avoid a run-off. Considering how many parties there are, it’s a high threshold; only three MPs from constituencies get to sit out the second round. In the remaining 68 constituencies, the Labor Party will have candidates in 36 elections. The conservatives will field 35, the Social Democrats 28, and the rest of the parties won’t even field ten apiece. So there will probably be opportunities for the three main parties to solidify their ruling coalition (in the case of Labor and the Social Democrats) and the opposition, in the case of the conservatives.

Interestingly regarding inter-coalition politics, Labor is facing off against the Social Democrats in a total of 17 constituencies. Order and Justice faces off against one of these two parties in five constituencies. If my math is right, we know that, no matter what, 49 seats in Seimas will be split between Labor and the Social Democrats: 17 and 15 via proportional voting, and 17 more where one of the parties is guaranteed to win in the second round. If we add Order and Justice, that brings the coalition up to 60 (49 + 6 + 5) (out of 141) seats, so the three parties need only to win 11 more elections against other parties in order to carve out a straight majority.

So those are the numbers. What do I think of the results? Well, the party I voted for won’t have a single seat in the Seimas, and the person I voted for in my constituency won’t be in the second round (though she may still be seated by her party among the proportional seats). So clearly the people I wanted to win didn’t. I had also read in Veidas a few weeks ago that there would likely be a coalition of Social Democrats and populists (Labor and Order and Justice), so that’s not surprising, either, though I was led to think that Butkevičius would be the next prime minister, not Uspaskich. But that may still come true—we’ll see what kind of horsetrading goes on once the dust settles after the second round.

Nearly everyone I know voted either conservative or liberal (or I suspect they did), and they’re distraught by the results. Uspaskich has, as we’d say in the US, “high negatives” among my circle. He comes up short against the xenophobes because he’s Russian, he fails before the snobs because he’s a wildly successful businessman without much education, and for the wonks, his politics seem wildly out of touch: the poster I saw all around town bragged about how his party would more than double the minimum wage within a year. To get a sense of the derision he earns from my hipster set, one can merely look at the top story yesterday on Lietuvos Rytas, which showed how Uspaskich (or his driver) scoff at parking laws.2  A whole lot is unsaid in that photo: he flaunts the laws (his diplomatic immunity has been an issue for years), he’s an arriviste, and his populism is merely a cover for his own unlikely (socio)economic advancement.

Uspaskich would bring Lithuania closer to Russia. The Social Democrats are, in the opinion of most of my friends, crypto-communists. So the new coalition will be pro-Russian communists with a touch of totalitarian populism added by Order and Justice. From how they’re talking, the Soviet days are back, baby! (Well the Ukraine girls really knock me out… They leave the West behind…)

  1. I’m trying to get my hands on the shapefile used in the map. If I get that, I’ll make some maps that are streets ahead of what has been officially provided.
  2. The headline reads, literally, “Delirious from victory, V. Uspaskich spit on the Rules of the Road.”
 Posted by on October 17, 2012
Aug 232012
 

As a rule I try to keep posts that curate a small set of links to papers on the cinema arising outside film studies to the last Thursday of the month, but we need to bring this one forward by a week to give me time to do some other things for subsequent posts.

More excitingly, it gives me a chance to link my interest in the cinema to my interest in cartography. I am obsessed with maps (and satellite images and aerial photography too), and will quite happily spend hours looking an atlas. They are simply fascinating things. If you want to see map-making at its most fascinating then check out the Warren-Bachelder maps of the battle of Gettysburg here.

The best place to start is this introduction to a special issue of The Cartographic Journal.

Caquard S and Taylor F 2009 What is cinematic cartography?, The Cartographic Journal 46 (1): 5-8.

Maps are ubiquitous in movies. They appear constantly and in a variety of forms: hung on the wall of a classroom, framed in an office, and unfolded by gangsters on a table. In movies maps serve a variety of purposes: They serve as decoration, as a means of location, to aid narration, as metaphors as well as to increase the dramatic tension of a sequence. They can play a prominent role in the unfolding of the action or appear only for a split second behind a closing door. They can serve to address the audience or as a mean of interaction between characters. They can be classic and static, or unique and dynamic. This pervasive presence of diverse cartographic artifacts in films contrasts dramatically with the marginal impact that cinematographic techniques, concepts and artifacts have had on cartography over the course of the last century. There has been substantial use of cartography in cinema but this has had very limited impact on the theory and practice of cartography.

From the same issue we have Sébastien Caquard’s article on digital cartography and its relation to cinema.

Caquard S 2009 Foreshadowing contemporary digital cartography: a historical review of cinematic maps in films, The Cartographic Journal 46 (1): 46-55.

Through an historical review of cinematic maps – or ‘cinemaps’ – this paper argues that contemporary digital cartography was conceptualized in films. This argument is first developed through a discussion of the emergence of animated maps in docudramas of the 1910s. These early cinemaps were followed by more sophisticated examples that foreshadowed the structure and design principles of ‘modern’ cartography. The cinemap that appears in the movie M (Fritz Lang, 1931) can be considered the first ‘modern’ map as it prefigures many of the current functions of contemporary digital cartography such as the combination image/map, use of sound, shifts in perspective and spatial analysis. The remaining functions of digital cartography, including zooming and live data rendering, were conceptualized in cinema by the 1960s, as illustrated by examples from movies such as Casablanca, Dr. Strangelove and Goldfinger. When professional cartographers were creating their first animated maps, most of the functions of contemporary digital cartography had already been implemented in cinema. Building on these results, the paper anticipates the future incursion of mapping technologies into interpersonal, confidential and private spaces through the study of contemporary cinemaps.

From a leter issue in the same volume we also have an interesting dialogue between a catrographer (Caquard) and a filmmaker (Amelia Bryne).

Caquard S and Bryne A 2009 Mapping globalization: a conversation between a filmmaker and a cartographer, The Cartographic Journal 46 (4): 372-378.

This paper is an edited version of a written dialogue that took place between the fall of 2008 and the summer of 2009 between a filmmaker (Amelia Bryne) and a cartographer (Sébastien Caquard) around the issue of representing globalization. In these conversations we define some of the key means for representing globalization in both mapmaking and filmmaking discussing local/global, strategic/tactical, data/narrative, and unique/multiple perspectives. We conclude by emphasizing the potential impact of new media in ushering in hybrid digital products that merge means of representation traditional to filmmaking and cartography.

And now for some other papers:

Barnet M-C 2011 ‘Elles-Ils Islands:’ cartography of lives and deaths by Agnès Varda, L’Esprit Crateur 51 (1): 97-111.

My article will analyze some of [Agnès Varda's] latest projects, the (nomadic, international) art installations that she invents, modulates, and thoughtfully adapts or alters, according to different spaces and cities. They follow therefore the location-scouting process of her films, driven by discovering places and people. I will focus on her relatively “new waves” and (mis)directions given in L’Île et Elle, her monumental efforts to recreate her world linked to the Île de Noir-moutier, if not to say the big expanse of the Atlantic ocean, around the twenty kilometre-long island, off the Western coast of France, which was her major exhibition at the Fondation Cartier in 2006, with echoes of her touring exhibitions of sea huts and portraits in Sète (2007) and Basel (2010).

Lukinbeal C 2010 Mobilizing the cartographic paradox: tracing the aspect of cartography and prospect of cinema, Digital Thematic Education 11 (2): 1-32.

Understanding the contrast and challenge of cinematic cartographies may lie in querying what John Pickles (2004, p.89) calls the “cartographic paradox.” The cartographic paradox is that linear perspective and projectionism inform cartographic practice. Yet, these two scopic regimes are both complementary and contradictory. The cartographic paradox has been mobilized by montage, animation and motion pictures. The penultimate technology of linear perspective is cinema, whereas the penultimate technology of projectionism is GIS and animated cartography. I argue that understanding the mobilization of these scopic regimes may lead to the production of affective geovisualizations.

Patch AM 2010 Nicolas Roeg/Chromatic Cartography, unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Exeter.

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the function of colour in film through three films by British director Nicolas Roeg. To this end, this thesis has the following three correspondent aims: first to consider the theoretical relationship between colour and film within film studies as a discipline. Second, to propose a means of discussing film colour outside the dominant approach of restoration and degradation. Third to explore how Roeg’s implements colour within three of his films Performance, Don’t Look Now, and finally Bad Timing, and the ideological and aesthetic questions that emerge through a consideration of colour in these works. By looking at colour and Nicolas Roeg this thesis will not only present a critical response to the research question but it will also fill a small gap in the current dearth of work that exists on both colour and British cinema in the 1970s.